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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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(a). A future Constitution assuring efficient government in accordance
with the will of the people.
(b). A democratic system of elections to legislative and local govern-
mental bodies.
(c), A re-organisation of the agrarian system by the parcelling and distri-
bution of German property and of all estates over fifty hectares and the
transfer of the excess of agricultural population to work in industry.
(d). The socialisation of key industries.
(e). Co-operation of employees and workers in the direction and control
of industrial production.
(f). A guarantee of work and adequate conditions of existence to all
(g). A just distribution of the national income.
(h).   I he extension of education and culture to all without exception,
Mikolajczyk's Memorandum was forwarded to Warsaw at the end of
August when the battle for that city was raging at its height. It was
accompanied by the explanation that it was the only way to ensure
continued British support. In the event of it being rejected., " the last
threads uniting us with the British will snap . . . 3> which could only mean
to those people fighting in Warsaw that the city would be left to her own
The c Council of National Unity' in the Polish capital received the
Memorandum at a time when the main problem was to survive for one
more day. They realised that if help did not come and the Germans
crushed the rising then the sacrifice of the Capital and the Home Army
would be in vain. At such a bitter moment they had scant opportunity
to consider the document.
But3 despite this, the * Council' replied by declaring its desire to help
the Government reach a solution of the Polish-Soviet difficulties^ stating
" it was faced with the making of a decision^ the motives underlying which
it did not understand, as sufficient information of the existing international
situation was not reaching the Council." It agreed that the Government
in London could commence negotiations., but added a number of restric-
tions suggested and forwarded by the Socialists which considerably
changed the essentials of the Memorandum. First and foremost^ the
c Council of National Unity J stated that an agreement with Russia could
be concluded only if accompanied by the guarantee of Britain and the
United States, and only after representatives of the Polish Government
had arrived in Warsaw to form a new government. The e Councily then
asked that Russia should recognise the Home Army and release the Polish
citizens who had been imprisoned by the Soviet occupation authorities,
and that representatives of the United States and Britain should simul-
taneously arrive in Warsaw. " The elections/' emphasised the' Council/
" could only be undertaken after the Soviet troops had left Poland." It
went on to comment on the Polish Government's " change of policy
regarding its country > which had opened the way for a withdrawal from
the frontier of the Riga Treaty/5 and noted as wellC£ that it had laid itself